Corporate social responsibility signalling under external transparency demands

IF 7.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE International Review of Financial Analysis Pub Date : 2025-02-23 DOI:10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104045
Jamal A. Nazari, Ehsan Poursoleyman
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Drawing on the premise that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditures may contain valuable private information about future financial outcomes, we explore the conditions necessary to decode this signalling component. Given that monitoring fosters credibility and trust, we posit that increased external pressures for transparency encourage investors and creditors to perceive the private information embedded in CSR reports. Given the heterogeneity of external transparency within and across countries, we employ both a firm-level proxy that minimizes firm-specific incentives as well as country-level proxy based on two exogenous shocks. We resort to the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the implementation of the EU's mandatory CSR transparency regulation, Directive 2014/95/EU, to capture country-level external transparency. Our findings indicate that the positive signalling effect of CSR expenditures is strongly linked to a reduced likelihood of financial constraints, with external transparency playing the driving role.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
9.80%
发文量
366
期刊介绍: The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
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