Incentive Mechanism Design for Trust-Driven Resources Trading in Computing Force Networks: Contract Theory Approach

Abstract

Recently, Computing Force Networks (CFNs) have emerged to deeply integrate and flexibly schedule multi-layer, multi-domain, distributed, and heterogeneous computing force resources. CFNs build a resources trading platform between consumers and providers, facilitating efficient resource sharing. Therefore, resources trading is an important issue but it faces some challenges. Firstly, because all kinds of large-scale and small-scale resource providers are distributed in a wide area and the number of consumers is larger compared with edge/cloud computing scenarios, the credibility of consumers and providers is hard to guarantee. Secondly, due to market monopolies by large resource providers, fixed pricing strategies, and information asymmetry, both consumers and providers exhibit a low willingness to engage in resources trading. To solve these challenges, the paper proposes an incentive mechanism for trust-driven resources trading to guarantee trusted and efficient resources trading. We first design a trust guarantee scheme based on reputation evaluation, blockchain, and trust threshold setting. Then, the proposed incentive scheme can dynamically adjust prices and enable the platform to provide appropriate rewards based on providers’ classified types and contributions. We formulate an optimization problem aiming at maximizing the trading platform’s utility and obtaining an optimal contract based on individual rationality and incentive compatible constraints. Simulation results verify the feasibility and effectiveness of our scheme, highlighting its potential to reshape the future of computing resource management, increase overall economic efficiency, and foster innovation and competitiveness in the digital economy.