Approximate Equilibrium in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

IF 0.6 4区 数学 Q3 MATHEMATICS Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI:10.1134/S1064562424702405
A. M. Pisareva, E. M. Parilina
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The paper studies a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. To maintain cooperation in the game, a new profile of behavior strategies is proposed, where the deviation of a player is punished not until the end of the game, but rather for a given number of stages depending on the stage of the game. The existence of an approximate equilibrium or epsilon-equilibrium in these strategies is proven, and the maximum payoff of a player deviating from the approximate equilibrium is found.

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有限重复囚徒困境的近似均衡
本文研究有限重复的囚徒困境。为了保持游戏中的合作,提出了一种新的行为策略,其中玩家的偏差直到游戏结束时才会受到惩罚,而是根据游戏的阶段在给定的阶段数内受到惩罚。证明了这些策略的近似均衡或epsilon均衡的存在性,并找到了偏离近似均衡的参与者的最大收益。
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来源期刊
Doklady Mathematics
Doklady Mathematics 数学-数学
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
16.70%
发文量
39
审稿时长
3-6 weeks
期刊介绍: Doklady Mathematics is a journal of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It contains English translations of papers published in Doklady Akademii Nauk (Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences), which was founded in 1933 and is published 36 times a year. Doklady Mathematics includes the materials from the following areas: mathematics, mathematical physics, computer science, control theory, and computers. It publishes brief scientific reports on previously unpublished significant new research in mathematics and its applications. The main contributors to the journal are Members of the RAS, Corresponding Members of the RAS, and scientists from the former Soviet Union and other foreign countries. Among the contributors are the outstanding Russian mathematicians.
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