{"title":"Can corruption punishment increase R&D subsidy policy effects? An empirical analysis based on quantitative and qualitative perspectives","authors":"Wencong Ma , Zili Chen , Xiude Chen , Kaihua Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jengtecman.2025.101872","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores the impact of corruption punishment on the effectiveness of R&D subsidy policies, using panel data from China’s A-share listed companies, with a focus on both the quantity and quality of innovation. The findings reveal that: (1) Corruption punishment weakens the positive effect of R&D subsidies on innovation quantity, while enhancing their positive effect on innovation quality. (2) Corruption punishment increases the significance of R&D investment in securing R&D subsidies and curbs the influence of rent-seeking behavior on obtaining these subsidies. (3) Strengthening corruption punishment is likely to amplify the patent value effect of R&D subsidies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50209,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Engineering and Technology Management","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101872"},"PeriodicalIF":3.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Engineering and Technology Management","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092347482500013X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study explores the impact of corruption punishment on the effectiveness of R&D subsidy policies, using panel data from China’s A-share listed companies, with a focus on both the quantity and quality of innovation. The findings reveal that: (1) Corruption punishment weakens the positive effect of R&D subsidies on innovation quantity, while enhancing their positive effect on innovation quality. (2) Corruption punishment increases the significance of R&D investment in securing R&D subsidies and curbs the influence of rent-seeking behavior on obtaining these subsidies. (3) Strengthening corruption punishment is likely to amplify the patent value effect of R&D subsidies.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Engineering and Technology Management (JET-M) is an international scholarly refereed research journal which aims to promote the theory and practice of technology, innovation, and engineering management.
The journal links engineering, science, and management disciplines. It addresses the issues involved in the planning, development, and implementation of technological capabilities to shape and accomplish the strategic and operational objectives of an organization. It covers not only R&D management, but also the entire spectrum of managerial concerns in technology-based organizations. This includes issues relating to new product development, human resource management, innovation process management, project management, technological fusion, marketing, technological forecasting and strategic planning.
The journal provides an interface between technology and other corporate functions, such as R&D, marketing, manufacturing and administration. Its ultimate goal is to make a profound contribution to theory development, research and practice by serving as a leading forum for the publication of scholarly research on all aspects of technology, innovation, and engineering management.
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