With strings attached: Gift-giving to the International Atomic Energy Agency and US foreign policy

Abstract

In 1958 the United States of America offered two mobile radioisotope laboratories to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as gifts. For the USA, supplying the IAEA with gifts was not only the cost of “doing business” in the new nuclear international setting of the Cold War, but also indispensable in maintaining authority and keeping the upper hand within the IAEA and in the international regulation of nuclear energy. The transformation of a technoscientific artefact into a diplomatic gift with political strings attached for both giver and receiver, positions the lab qua gift as a critical key that simultaneously unlocks the overlapping histories of international affairs, Cold War diplomacy, and postwar nuclear science. Embracing political epistemology as my primary methodological framework and introducing the gift as a major analytic category, I emphasize the role of material objects in modeling scientific research and training in a way that is dictated by diplomatic negotiations, state power, and international legal arrangements.