Mood, Delusions and Poetry: Emotional 'Wording of the World' in Psychosis, Philosophy and the Everyday.

Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-05-27 DOI:10.1007/s11406-017-9854-8
Owen Earnshaw
{"title":"Mood, Delusions and Poetry: Emotional 'Wording of the World' in Psychosis, Philosophy and the Everyday.","authors":"Owen Earnshaw","doi":"10.1007/s11406-017-9854-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Starting from a comparison of the similarities between a poem by Sylvia Plath called <i>Tulips</i> and the words of someone in the thrall of a delusion I develop a phenomenology of how mood is basic to our articulation of the world. To develop this argument I draw on Heidegger's (1962) concept of attunement [befindlichkeit] and his contention that basic emotions open up aspects of the world for closer inspection and articulation. My thesis in this paper is that there is an underlying structural similarity between the forms of words used in poems and those found in medically diagnosed delusions and this similarity is based on the role of mood in both arenas. The difference, I argue, is that although both forms of articulation are negotiated 'as if' the subject matter was literal, the person writing the poem is self-aware that their uses of language are figurative and metaphorical. This is because the emotional lens they use to describe a situation poetically can always be removed by a return to a ground-mood of acceptance, that prevents them from becoming lost in the poetical mood. The person experiencing psychosis, on the other hand, is unable to extricate herself from the mood that underlies their delusional utterances as they have lost access to the ground-mood that the poet takes for granted. I illustrate the point using Hume's famous statement about the mood he philosophises in and look at ways sufferers from delusions could regain a sense of the non-literal projections of their words.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-017-9854-8","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9854-8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2017/5/27 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

Starting from a comparison of the similarities between a poem by Sylvia Plath called Tulips and the words of someone in the thrall of a delusion I develop a phenomenology of how mood is basic to our articulation of the world. To develop this argument I draw on Heidegger's (1962) concept of attunement [befindlichkeit] and his contention that basic emotions open up aspects of the world for closer inspection and articulation. My thesis in this paper is that there is an underlying structural similarity between the forms of words used in poems and those found in medically diagnosed delusions and this similarity is based on the role of mood in both arenas. The difference, I argue, is that although both forms of articulation are negotiated 'as if' the subject matter was literal, the person writing the poem is self-aware that their uses of language are figurative and metaphorical. This is because the emotional lens they use to describe a situation poetically can always be removed by a return to a ground-mood of acceptance, that prevents them from becoming lost in the poetical mood. The person experiencing psychosis, on the other hand, is unable to extricate herself from the mood that underlies their delusional utterances as they have lost access to the ground-mood that the poet takes for granted. I illustrate the point using Hume's famous statement about the mood he philosophises in and look at ways sufferers from delusions could regain a sense of the non-literal projections of their words.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
情绪、妄想与诗歌:精神病、哲学与日常生活中的感性“世界措辞”。
从比较西尔维娅·普拉斯的一首名为《郁金香》的诗和一个被错觉束缚的人的话语之间的相似之处开始,我发展了一种现象学,即情绪是我们表达世界的基础。为了发展这一论点,我借鉴了海德格尔(1962)的调谐概念,以及他的论点,即基本情感为更仔细的检查和表达打开了世界的各个方面。我在这篇论文中的论点是,诗歌中使用的词汇形式与医学诊断的妄想中发现的词汇形式之间存在潜在的结构相似性,这种相似性是基于情绪在这两个领域中的作用。我认为,不同之处在于,尽管这两种形式的表达都是“仿佛”主题是字面上的,但写诗的人自我意识到他们对语言的使用是比喻和隐喻的。这是因为他们用来诗意地描述一种情况的情感镜头总是可以通过回归到一种接受的基本情绪而被移除,这可以防止他们迷失在诗意的情绪中。另一方面,患有精神病的人无法从他们妄想的话语背后的情绪中解脱出来,因为他们失去了与地面的联系——诗人认为理所当然的情绪。我用休谟那句著名的话来说明这一点,那句话是关于他哲学思考时的情绪,并看看患有错觉的人是如何重新获得他们话语的非字面投射感的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
W. Matthews Grant's Dual Sources Account and Ultimate Responsibility. Taxation in the COVID-19 Pandemic: to Pay or Not to Pay. The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism. The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al. Junk Science, Junk Journals, and Junk Publishing Management: Risk to Science's Credibility.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1