Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.

Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-03-08 DOI:10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5
Björn Lundgren
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

In this reply I defend Kripke's creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Goodman's counter-argument to the thesis ("Creatures of fiction, objects of myth", Analysis, 74(1), 35-40, 2014). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke's theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.

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错误之于神话就像虚伪之于小说:对古德曼的回复。
在这篇回复中,我为克里普克关于神话对象的创造论论点(参考与存在,2013)辩护,反对杰弗里·古德曼对该论点的反驳(“虚构的生物,神话的对象”,分析,74(1),35-40,2014)。我认为古德曼搞错了神话抽象创作的基础。与古德曼相反,我表明,克里普克的理论始终保留了神话对象的创造与虚构对象的创造之间的相似性,同时也解释了它们的不同之处。
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