Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action.

Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-02-07 DOI:10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5
Erik Ringmar
{"title":"Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action.","authors":"Erik Ringmar","doi":"10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as \"the will\" and \"freedom\" are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":"45 4","pages":"1527-1539"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5","citationCount":"19","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2017/2/7 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19

Abstract

In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as "the will" and "freedom" are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
非审议性的、基于情绪的行动理论大纲。
本杰明·利贝特(Benjamin Libet)在一系列著名的实验中声称,他已经证明,我们对意志自由的常识性理解没有科学依据。我们将要采取的行动在我们有意识的头脑中记录下来之前就已经在我们的大脑中记录下来了。然而,利贝特可能已经表明,诸如“意志”和“自由”等长期被引用的概念不能很好地解释行动是如何发起的。当我们对所处环境的情绪做出反应时,行动就会发生。行动是调节我们自己的一种方式。简单的行为发生在长期形成的习惯中,复杂的行为发生在情境的情绪与我们告诉自己的故事的情绪相呼应时。当感觉对的时候,我们就行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy. W. Matthews Grant's Dual Sources Account and Ultimate Responsibility. Taxation in the COVID-19 Pandemic: to Pay or Not to Pay. The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism. The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1