Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle.

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-01-01 Epub Date: 2017-04-12 DOI:10.1007/s11245-017-9482-8
Jonathan Pugh
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Abstract

A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements (NCMBEs) is that they would compromise the recipient's 'freedom to fall'. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu's 'God-Machine' criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether the objection is compatible with Neil Levy's parity principle. Accordingly, I go on to consider an alternative relational freedom-based objection to NCMBEs that aims to explain the fundamental moral importance of the freedom that NCMBEs would violate. I argue that although this strategy might allow the critic of NCMBEs to bypass a powerful criticism of Harris' objection, it also weakens the freedom-based objection's compatibility with the parity principle.

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道德生物强化、自由、价值和平等原则。
对非认知道德生物强化(NCMBE)的一个突出反对意见是,它们会损害接受者的“跌倒自由”。我首先讨论了这个异议中的一些歧义,然后概述了亚里士多德对它的解读。我认为,这篇解读可能有助于阻止佩尔森和萨武列斯库的“上帝机器”批评;然而,我认为反对意见仍然面临着解释为什么道德一致性的价值不足以超过堕落自由本身的价值的问题。我还质疑反对意见是否符合Neil Levy的平等原则。因此,我继续考虑一种基于关系自由的反对NCMBE的替代方案,旨在解释NCMBE将侵犯的自由的根本道德重要性。我认为,尽管这一策略可能会让NCMBE的批评者绕过对哈里斯反对意见的有力批评,但它也削弱了基于自由的反对意见与平等原则的兼容性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
7.10%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Topoi''s main assumption is that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our received views, relentlessly questions our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of soothing our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a ''dialogue'', that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one''s approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one''s own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every corner, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect. Topoi''s structure is a direct expression of this view. To maximize discussion, we devote most or all of this issue to a single topic. And, since discussion is only interesting when it is conducted seriously and responsibly, we usually request the collaboration of a guest-editor, an expert who will identify contributors and interact with them in a constructive way. Because we do not feel tied to any definite philosophical theme (or set of them), we choose the topic with absolute freedom, looking for what is blossoming and thriving, occasionally betting on what might - partly through our attention - ''begin'' to blossom and thrive. And because we do not want our structur e to become our own straightjacket, we are open to contributions not fitting the ''topos'', and do not rule out in principle the possibility of topic-less issues.
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