Adversarial Argument, Belief Change, and Vulnerability.

IF 1.3 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-10-16 DOI:10.1007/s11245-021-09769-8

Moira Howes, Catherine Hundleby

引用次数: 1

Abstract

When people argue, they are vulnerable to unwanted and costly changes in their beliefs. This vulnerability motivates the position that belief involuntarism makes argument inherently adversarial (Casey, Informal Log 40:77-108, 2020), as well as the development of alternatives to adversarial argumentation such as "invitational rhetoric" (Foss and Griffin, Commun Monogr 62:2-18, 1995). The emphasis on involuntary belief change in such accounts, in our perspective, neglects three dimensions of arguing: the diversity of arguer intentions, audience agency, and the benefits of belief change. The complex impact of arguments on both audiences and arguers involves vulnerabilities related to various forces of argument, not just the intellectual force of premise-conclusion complexes. Shifting emphasis from adversariality to vulnerability, we propose a more holistic understanding of argument, in which vulnerability reveals various sources of strength and opportunity in addition to risk.

查看原文

微信好友朋友圈 QQ好友复制链接

本刊更多论文

对抗性的争论，信念的改变和脆弱性。

当人们争论时，他们的信念很容易受到不必要的、代价高昂的改变。这种脆弱性促使人们认为，信仰不自主主义使论证本质上是对抗性的(Casey，非正式日志40:77- 108,2020)，以及对抗性论证的替代方案的发展，如“邀请修辞”(Foss和Griffin, common Monogr 62:2- 18,1995)。在我们看来，在这些叙述中强调非自愿的信念改变，忽略了争论的三个维度:辩论者意图的多样性、听众代理和信念改变的好处。论证对听众和论证者的复杂影响涉及到与各种论证力量相关的脆弱性，而不仅仅是前提-结论复合体的智力力量。将重点从对抗性转移到脆弱性，我们提出了对论证的更全面的理解，其中脆弱性揭示了除了风险之外的各种力量和机会来源。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文去求助

来源期刊

TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

7.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Topoi''s main assumption is that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our received views, relentlessly questions our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of soothing our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a ''dialogue'', that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one''s approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one''s own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every corner, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect. Topoi''s structure is a direct expression of this view. To maximize discussion, we devote most or all of this issue to a single topic. And, since discussion is only interesting when it is conducted seriously and responsibly, we usually request the collaboration of a guest-editor, an expert who will identify contributors and interact with them in a constructive way. Because we do not feel tied to any definite philosophical theme (or set of them), we choose the topic with absolute freedom, looking for what is blossoming and thriving, occasionally betting on what might - partly through our attention - ''begin'' to blossom and thrive. And because we do not want our structur e to become our own straightjacket, we are open to contributions not fitting the ''topos'', and do not rule out in principle the possibility of topic-less issues.

期刊最新文献

Virtuous Collective Attention. Being a Direct Realist – Searle, McDowell, and Travis on ‘seeing things as they are’ More on Williams on Ethical Knowledge and Reflection Virtue Ethics and the Morality System Having a Cake and Eating It Too? Direct Realism and Objective Identity in Descartes