The Real Problem with Hypothetical Constructs.

Abstract

A recent discussion in this journal revolved around the issue of whether postulating internal clocks is harmful or beneficial to scientific psychology, and how. I argue that this and other discussions on the topic have yet to address the real problem: The concept of a hypothetical construct is unintelligible. Psychologists agree that all entities that constitute hypothetical constructs are unobservable, importantly different from observable entities, including overt behavior and its environment. The root issue at hand here, then, is the observable-unobservable distinction. Psychologists have implicitly but erroneously taken it for granted as sufficiently unproblematic to warrant meaningful discussions based on it, when in fact it is a pernicious untenable remnant of logical positivism. All previous discussions of hypothetical constructs in psychology have overlooked arguments against this view in the philosophy of science. These arguments are sufficiently compelling to at least question, if not cease altogether, talk of observability, unobservability, and HCs in psychology as useless, even harmful.