Dretske's Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis.

Manas Kumar Sahu
{"title":"Dretske's Naturalistic Representationalism and Privileged Accessibility Thesis.","authors":"Manas Kumar Sahu","doi":"10.1007/s11406-022-00578-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The objective of the current paper is to provide a critical analysis of Dretske's defense of the naturalistic version of the privileged accessibility thesis. Dretske construed that the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility neither relies on the appeal to perspectival ontology of phenomenal subjectivity nor on the functionalistic notion of accessibility. He has reformulated introspection (which justifies the non-inferentiality of the knowledge of one's own mental facts in an internalist view) as a displaced perception for the defense of naturalistic privileged accessibility. Both internalist and externalist have been approved the plausibility of first-person authority argument through privileged accessibility; however, their disagreement lies on the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility. Internalist hold the view that the justificatory warrant for privileged accessibility is grounded on phenomenal subjectivity. In contrast to the internalist view, externalists uphold the view that the justificatory condition for privileged accessibility lies outside the domain of phenomenal subjectivity. As a proponent of naturalistic content externalism, Dretske defends the view that subject's privileged accessibility is not due to having access to the particular representational state (hence, they have the privilege of getting sensory representational information) and the awareness of mental fact rather the awareness of the whole representational mechanism. Having the knowledge of a particular representational state through privileged access is not the sufficient condition for the accuracy of knowledge about one's own mental facts. The justificatory warrant lies external to the subject. Even though Dretske's naturalistic representation is not plausible enough while dealing with the reduction of phenomenal qualities of experience, however, provides a new roadmap to compatibilists for the defense of privileged accessibility and has a major impact on transparency theorists.</p>","PeriodicalId":74436,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","volume":" ","pages":"1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9476446/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia (Ramat-Gan, Israel)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00578-w","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The objective of the current paper is to provide a critical analysis of Dretske's defense of the naturalistic version of the privileged accessibility thesis. Dretske construed that the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility neither relies on the appeal to perspectival ontology of phenomenal subjectivity nor on the functionalistic notion of accessibility. He has reformulated introspection (which justifies the non-inferentiality of the knowledge of one's own mental facts in an internalist view) as a displaced perception for the defense of naturalistic privileged accessibility. Both internalist and externalist have been approved the plausibility of first-person authority argument through privileged accessibility; however, their disagreement lies on the justificatory condition of privileged accessibility. Internalist hold the view that the justificatory warrant for privileged accessibility is grounded on phenomenal subjectivity. In contrast to the internalist view, externalists uphold the view that the justificatory condition for privileged accessibility lies outside the domain of phenomenal subjectivity. As a proponent of naturalistic content externalism, Dretske defends the view that subject's privileged accessibility is not due to having access to the particular representational state (hence, they have the privilege of getting sensory representational information) and the awareness of mental fact rather the awareness of the whole representational mechanism. Having the knowledge of a particular representational state through privileged access is not the sufficient condition for the accuracy of knowledge about one's own mental facts. The justificatory warrant lies external to the subject. Even though Dretske's naturalistic representation is not plausible enough while dealing with the reduction of phenomenal qualities of experience, however, provides a new roadmap to compatibilists for the defense of privileged accessibility and has a major impact on transparency theorists.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
德雷茨克的自然主义表象论和特权可及论。
本文旨在对德雷特克为自然主义版本的特权可及性论题所做的辩护进行批判性分析。德雷茨克认为,特权可及性的合理性条件既不依赖于对现象主观性的视角本体论的诉求,也不依赖于可及性的功能主义概念。他将内省(在内部主义观点中,内省证明了对自身心理事实的知识的非推断性)重新表述为一种为自然主义特权可及性辩护的置换知觉。内部论者和外部论者都通过特权可及性认可了第一人称权威论证的合理性,但他们的分歧在于特权可及性的正当性条件。内部论者认为,特权可及性的正当理由是以现象主观性为基础的。与内部论者的观点相反,外部论者认为,特权可及性的正当性条件在现象主观性领域之外。作为自然主义内容外在论的支持者,德雷茨克捍卫这样一种观点,即主体的特权可及性不是因为能够进入特定的表象状态(因此,他们拥有获得感官表象信息的特权)和对心理事实的意识,而是对整个表象机制的意识。通过特权获得对特定表象状态的认识,并不是对自己心理事实认识准确性的充分条件。合理性的保证在主体之外。尽管德雷茨克的自然主义表征在处理经验现象特质的还原时不够合理,但是,它为兼容论者提供了一个为特权可及性辩护的新路线图,并对透明论者产生了重大影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy. W. Matthews Grant's Dual Sources Account and Ultimate Responsibility. Taxation in the COVID-19 Pandemic: to Pay or Not to Pay. The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism. The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1