Strategic Behavior in State Multimember Districts: Does Fielding One Candidate offer a Notable Advantage?

Abstract

In several U.S. states, legislative districts for the lower chamber are structured as multi-member districts (MMD) electing two or more individuals. Ten states use MMDs, the most common form is a district that elects two candidates (employed in AZ, ND, NJ, SD). Sometimes, parties in these states field only one strong candidate in districts where they have a registration disadvantage, believing this “single shot” strategy improves the election odds. Our research casts doubt on this tactic. It finds that lone Democrats in a pooled sample of three states see a noted disadvantage by widening the electoral gap by 3.3 percentage points on average, meaning that parties are better off running two candidates regardless of their relative quality. However, this effect varies within states. Republicans do not experience a disadvantage, though fewer Democratic-leaning states employ this election method. This research has practical implications for party strategy in MMD states.