Proportionality as Fittingness: The Moral Dimension of Proportionality

Abstract

Outside law we often judge an action to be wrongful in virtue of being disproportionate. This paper aims to develop a moral account of proportionality as it figures outside law, with a view to shed light on legal doctrines that employ proportionality reasoning. The understanding of proportionality as a balancing act between harms and goods, popular amongst lawyers, lacks a moral dimension capable of justifying why disproportionate action is wrong. The paper defends instead a reason-based approach. It argues that the moral dimension of proportionality lies in the idea of obligations of role: an action is proportionate when it fits the reasons that pertain to the normative role of the acting agent, properly understood. Proportionality as fittingness captures better not only the use of proportionality outside law but also judicial outcomes under proportionality reasoning.