Law as Peace (Or Why I Am Still a Hard-Core Positivist)

Abstract

The fact that the most prominent brands of positivism and natural law theory, namely their Razian and Finnisian variants, are in agreement about some hitherto hotly contested issues has over the decades become more of an entertaining curio than an actual concern that ruffles any theoretical feathers. Whatever its benefits, this great convergence requires positivism to forfeit much of what has originally made it a theoretically appealing position. One of the many reasons for the curious alignment of positivism with natural law theory has been a focus on the explanatory power and theoretical import of the phenomenon of friendship. If we allow the countervailing forces of enmity to be given their due weight, a different model of law emerges, namely law as peace, which is more resistant to the contortions and ultimate self-abandonment that ensues from the alignment of positivism with natural law theory.