Lost in the Supermarket? A Commentary on Gries, Müller, and Jost

Abstract

Scholars have long-debated how citizens come to adopt a political ideology. Whereas some suggest that material needs and/or self-interest motivate citizens to endorse the issue positions and ideological stances that maximize utility (see Chong, 2000; Chong & Mullinix, 2022; Sniderman, Glaser, & Griffin, 1991; Weeden & Kurzban, 2017), others argue that less rational—and even irrational—forces are at play and instead focus on the psychological needs met by (Jost, 2020, 2021; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b), as well as symbolic attachments to (Jardina, 2019; Reny & Sears, 2020; Sears, 1993; Sears & Henry, 2005), specific ideologies. It seems that the extant literature is at an impasse over the antecedents to belief systems. Are citizens rational? Or are they not? Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) reconcile these contrasting perspectives by asserting that both rational and irrational processes motivate people’s ideological preferences. To these ends, the authors develop a comprehensive model of ideological choice that incorporates both (a) psychological and (b) consumption needs which are weighted by the importance assigned to them by the individual. On the other end of the production chain, ideological entrepreneurs supply ideologies that differentially reconcile these demands and disseminate them within a larger marketplace of beliefs. Although a formal mathematical model is used to identify the ideologies available within the frontier of options that best reconcile these dual needs, Gries et al. assert that, given the informational costs associated with becoming perfectly informed, most citizens simply “try out” different ideologies until they find one that satisfices their psychological and consumption needs. In seeking to resolve the perennial quandary over the determinants of ideology, Gries et al. (this issue) make multiple important contributions to the literature. First, in our view, much of the debate over mass belief systems entails discussions where both parties talk past one another. Those in the ideological purists camp (generally comprised of political scientists) define ideology in rigid terms focused on the presence of a stable and coherent belief system as articulated by Converse (1964) and others, whereas those in the ideological minimalists camp (often comprised of psychologists) have resuscitated the competence of the average voter by treating ideology as a self-defined/identity-based concept present in the vast majority of people (Jost, 2006, 2021). Gries et al. bridge this divide by acknowledging that ideologies are comprised of a “network of attitudes and beliefs... [that are] linked together logically and/or psychologically” (p. 65). Such a compromise brings both sides of this seemingly intractable conflict together and provides the foundations for a promising resolution to one of the most enduring debates in political psychology. In a similar manner, Gries et al. (this issue) help to reconcile the debate over rational and irrational approaches to political ideology by recognizing that both play a role in shaping people’s issue positions. Whereas there is a longstanding tradition of scholars pitting symbolic and self-interested approaches against each other when explaining political attitudes (e.g., Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980; Weeden & Kurzban, 2017), Gries et al. develop a sophisticated model that acknowledges that psychological and consumption needs collectively motivate people to adopt an ideology that best-satisfies these needs. Specifically, the weighting factor within their model recognizes that people will assign different levels of importance to reconciling these distinct needs. For some, an ideology that partially satisfies a highly valued consumption need will be more appealing than a competing ideology that fully satisfies epistemic needs for certainty. Conversely, others will choose an ideology that fulfills their need to belong even if it conflicts with their consumption needs. In this sense, Gries et al.’s model help explains how both psychological and consumption needs motivate people to adopt a given ideology from the larger marketplace of ideas. Gries et al.’s (this issue) mathematical model of ideological choice also helps to reduce the ambiguity inherent in variables measured within the behavioral sciences (but see our discussion on the falsifiability of the model below). Indeed, as noted by the authors, “ordinary language is inherently ambiguous” (p. 70). Nebulous concepts like “self-interest,” “rationality,” and “epistemic needs” belie direct measurement and render explicit hypothesis testing difficult or near impossible. By explicitly quantifying, a priori, the relationships that psychological and consumption needs have with ideologies and their respective (perceived) abilities to resolve these needs, the authors provide a useful tool for evaluating the rationality of citizens. That is, the rationality of the public can be assessed within Gries et al.’s model by calculating the multivariate distance between people’s ideological choice and the array of (weighted) psychological and consumption needs that motivate their beliefs—the further