{"title":"Reframing patient-doctor relationships: relational autonomy and treating autonomy as a virtue","authors":"Élaina Gauthier-Mamaril","doi":"10.1080/17449626.2022.2053188","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite extensive theoretical debate, concrete efforts to overcome paternalism and unbalanced power relations between patients and doctors have produced limited results. In this article, I examine and build on the concept of relational autonomy to reframe the patient-doctor relationship. Specifically, I argue for an alternate form of autonomy anchored in Spinozism that recognises the relation between rationality and affectivity and moves away from the model of Cartesian dualism. I then use Filipino conceptions of individuality to explore treating autonomy as a systemic virtue, where ‘virtue’ is understood as a strength that requires support from systems of agency. In other words, autonomy as a systemic virtue is a practice of focusing on one’s power of acting that is sustained by supportive relationships between individuals and social institutions.","PeriodicalId":35191,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Ethics","volume":"18 1","pages":"32 - 47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Global Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2022.2053188","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
ABSTRACT Despite extensive theoretical debate, concrete efforts to overcome paternalism and unbalanced power relations between patients and doctors have produced limited results. In this article, I examine and build on the concept of relational autonomy to reframe the patient-doctor relationship. Specifically, I argue for an alternate form of autonomy anchored in Spinozism that recognises the relation between rationality and affectivity and moves away from the model of Cartesian dualism. I then use Filipino conceptions of individuality to explore treating autonomy as a systemic virtue, where ‘virtue’ is understood as a strength that requires support from systems of agency. In other words, autonomy as a systemic virtue is a practice of focusing on one’s power of acting that is sustained by supportive relationships between individuals and social institutions.