CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON ALLIANCE AND ALIGNMENT: ENTRAPMENT CONCERNS IN CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Abstract

The article traces concerns about entrapment in Chinese thinking about foreign relations and how these concerns have resulted in a general rejection of alliances. The People’s Republic of China was born with entrapment dilemmas vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that became real when Beijing was drawn into the Korean War at a time that did not suit Beijing’s strategic interests. During the post-Cold War era, China’s dialogue and coordination with NATO has given its leadership greater knowledge of the alliance’s strengths and weaknesses and confirmed Beijing in its scepticism towards formal alliances. Instead, China has set out to build more flexible partnerships, particularly with Russia, that allow both sides of the arrangement to avoid entrapment in each other’s different geopolitical security agendas. In an era of strategic competition with the United States, Beijing’s partnership with Moscow has become the cornerstone of Chinese efforts to protect its global power and influence. At the same time, China’s leadership has sought to avoid new entrapments by expanding its security engagement with countries in the “Global South”. Besides commitments to limited cooperation such as joint exercises and training, protection of Chinese overseas interests in arms sales, in countering Western strategic aims, and in establishing a strategic military presence are at the centre of such engagements. Far-reaching commitments to protect the security interests of other countries and close integration of Chinese and foreign military forces are not on the cards. Such agreements would come at the cost of flexible partnerships and Beijing’s freedom of action.