Why Changes in PBGC and FDIC Premiums Should Not Fully Reflect Changes in Underlying Risk (With Some Application to Long-Term Private Insurance Contracts)

Abstract

The degree of risk adjustment in both FDIC and PBGC premiums appears to be much smaller than actuarially fair. We explore why this is using a stylized theoretical model of multiperiod insurance contracts in the presence of moral hazard where the risk status of insureds changes over the life of the contract. If insureds value stable premiums and there is moral hazard, we show that the optimal multiperiod insurance contract for full insurance allocates greater premiums to higher risk states, and lower premiums to lower risk states, but the optimal allocation of premiums across risk states will usually not be actuarially fair. The degree of risk adjustment rises with the extent of moral hazard and falls as risk aversion rises. We extend our analysis to examine optimal risk classification in private insurance in the presence of moral hazard, with similar results. We also discuss practical considerations that further reduce the desirability and feasibility of actuarially fair risk adjustments in premiums for the FDIC and PBGC, and show how our model extends prior work on social insurance with moral hazard.