{"title":"Self-control in action and belief","authors":"Martina Orlandi, Sarah Stroud","doi":"10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the perhaps unexpected idea that self-control is in fact a transversal phenomenon which is applicable both to action and to belief. While there may be some differences in how self-control is manifested in the respective realms of action and belief, these differences do not undermine the basic takeaway: that agents can and do exercise self-control with respect to both actions and beliefs. These arguments target synchronic self-control, or the exercise of self-control on a discrete occasion; in the final section, we examine whether there is also a more holistic trait or stable state of a person which could aptly be considered a form of self-control.","PeriodicalId":46014,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Explorations","volume":"24 1","pages":"225 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Explorations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908576","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
ABSTRACT Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the perhaps unexpected idea that self-control is in fact a transversal phenomenon which is applicable both to action and to belief. While there may be some differences in how self-control is manifested in the respective realms of action and belief, these differences do not undermine the basic takeaway: that agents can and do exercise self-control with respect to both actions and beliefs. These arguments target synchronic self-control, or the exercise of self-control on a discrete occasion; in the final section, we examine whether there is also a more holistic trait or stable state of a person which could aptly be considered a form of self-control.