{"title":"Governing the covid-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa: Containment Measures as a Public Good","authors":"Kevin Koehler, J. Schulhofer-Wohl","doi":"10.1163/18763375-13040003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nWhat determined how governments in the Middle East and North Africa reacted to the global covid-19 pandemic? We develop a theoretical argument based on the political costs of different policy options and assess its empirical relevance. Distinguishing between the immediate costs associated with decisive action and the potential costs of uncontrolled spread that are likely to accrue over the long term, we argue that leaders who have fewer incentives to provide public goods to stay in power will lock down later than their more constrained counterparts. We find empirical support for this argument in statistical analyses covering the 1 January – 30 November 2020 period using the Oxford covid-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) and our own original data on the timing of mosque closures and strict lockdowns across the region. We also illustrate our argument with a description of the response to the pandemic in Egypt.","PeriodicalId":43500,"journal":{"name":"Middle East Law and Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Middle East Law and Governance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-13040003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
What determined how governments in the Middle East and North Africa reacted to the global covid-19 pandemic? We develop a theoretical argument based on the political costs of different policy options and assess its empirical relevance. Distinguishing between the immediate costs associated with decisive action and the potential costs of uncontrolled spread that are likely to accrue over the long term, we argue that leaders who have fewer incentives to provide public goods to stay in power will lock down later than their more constrained counterparts. We find empirical support for this argument in statistical analyses covering the 1 January – 30 November 2020 period using the Oxford covid-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) and our own original data on the timing of mosque closures and strict lockdowns across the region. We also illustrate our argument with a description of the response to the pandemic in Egypt.
期刊介绍:
The aim of MELG is to provide a peer-reviewed venue for academic analysis in which the legal lens allows scholars and practitioners to address issues of compelling concern to the Middle East. The journal is multi-disciplinary – offering contributors from a wide range of backgrounds an opportunity to discuss issues of governance, jurisprudence, and socio-political organization, thereby promoting a common conceptual framework and vocabulary for exchanging ideas across boundaries – geographic and otherwise. It is also broad in scope, discussing issues of critical importance to the Middle East without treating the region as a self-contained unit.