Munday v Gill revisited: rethinking the summary jurisdiction

Abstract

ABSTRACT Even though approximately 97% of criminal offences are finalised in the summary jurisdiction, the High Court has only considered the nature of summary jurisdiction once: in 1930 in Munday v Gill. In that case, Isaacs CJ and Dixon J provided different characterisations of the summary jurisdiction. According to Dixon J, in the majority, in the summary jurisdiction efficiency may be prioritised over strict adherence to common law protections of the accused because it deals with minor criminal matters that are between subject and subject. In dissent, Isaacs CJ characterised summary criminal matters as between the Crown and subject, arguing that common law protections are as important in the summary jurisdiction as in the higher courts. Dixon J’s judgment is still cited as an accurate characterisation of the summary jurisdiction today, and yet the summary jurisdiction has transformed in the nine decades that have elapsed since the case was decided. This is reason to think Munday v Gill should be revisited. This article offers a critical analysis of the case by placing it in its social and historical context, showing that Isaacs CJ’s characterisation is more relevant today than that of Dixon J. It makes the case that because of this transformation, it is necessary to re-think the nature of a fair trial in the summary jurisdiction.