Piekący problemat Ingardena. Platonizm, uniwersalia i byty relacyjne

Abstract

I NGARDEN ’ S B URNING I SSUE : P LATONISM , U NIVERSALS , AND R ELATIONAL B EINGS In my recent book Tropy i uniwersalia ( Tropes and Universals ), I argued that Roman Ingarden’s theory of universals is in fact a kind of hidden nominalism. This claim has been subjected to serious criticism by Marek Piwowarczyk, who has defended Ingarden’s position and attempted to flesh out the Platonic theory of universals. In my reply, I argue that his interpretation of Platonism, though it fits Plato’s doctrine, does not correspond to Ingarden’s ontology. Ingarden, contrary to Piwowarczyk, did not regard participation between individual properties and pure ideal qualities as a kind of ontological dependence. Moreover, robust Platonism, proposed by Piwowarczyk, though solves some problems indicated in my book, has serious ontological consequences. Individuals have their character and existence in virtue of their relations to forms. Therefore, individuals are no longer independent substances, but rather relational beings. Perhaps it was Plato’s actual teaching, but it certainly contradicts Ingarden’s crucial insight that the world is ontologically autonomous. In this way, robust Platonism turns out to be surprisingly close to Idealism.