Metodologiczny postulat reizmu. Zarys analizy

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-12-31 DOI:10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0026
A. Chybińska
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

It is widely assumed that reism, a philosophical position introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, had two aspects: ontological and semantic. Sometimes it is also claimed that reism ultimately became a kind of methodological program. The aim of this article is to analyze the methodological aspect of reism (or methodological reism). Since Kotarbinski did not explicitly formulate this layer of his theory, the first part of the article attempts to reconstruct methodological reism. In the second part, I discuss some of its problems. Finally, in the third part, I try to show its merits.
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现实主义是塔德乌什·科塔宾斯基提出的一种哲学立场,人们普遍认为它具有本体论和语义学两个方面。有时也有人声称,现实主义最终成为一种方法论程序。本文的目的是分析现实主义(或方法论现实主义)的方法论方面。由于科塔宾斯基没有明确阐述他的理论的这一层,文章的第一部分试图重建方法论的现实主义。在第二部分,我讨论了它的一些问题。最后,在第三部分,我试图展示它的优点。
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来源期刊
Filozofia Nauki
Filozofia Nauki PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.50
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0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science) is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic quarterly published by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It publishes articles, notes, and reviews covering the whole range of analytic philosophy, including among others: epistemology, ontology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy. We invite papers not only from professional philosophers but also from specialists in different areas, interested in generalizing their scientific experiences towards more foundational issues.
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