{"title":"Belief and Knowledge","authors":"I. Narița","doi":"10.2478/saec-2022-0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There are possible two kinds of relationships between belief and knowledge: 1) belief is a necessary condition to knowledge; 2) belief and knowledge are contrary. While the first relation is held by the classical analysis of knowledge, the second one comes from the Kantian epistemology. In this work, we argue for the first solution, establishing the conditions for a belief to be knowledge.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2478/saec-2022-0012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract There are possible two kinds of relationships between belief and knowledge: 1) belief is a necessary condition to knowledge; 2) belief and knowledge are contrary. While the first relation is held by the classical analysis of knowledge, the second one comes from the Kantian epistemology. In this work, we argue for the first solution, establishing the conditions for a belief to be knowledge.
分享
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
