The First Amendment v. reproductive rights: Crisis pregnancy centers, commercial speech, and marketplaces of misinformation

Q2 Social Sciences First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI:10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763
Bradley Queen
{"title":"The First Amendment v. reproductive rights: Crisis pregnancy centers, commercial speech, and marketplaces of misinformation","authors":"Bradley Queen","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay responds to the holding in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra (2018), arguing that the signal contribution of the majority opinion is its attempt to move commercial speech further into the absolute realm of protected public discourse. In finding the California FACT Act to be unconstitutional, the 5–4 majority uses a fractured commercial speech standard to define NIFLA’s marketplace communications as protected ideological speech. In so doing, Justice Thomas, author of the majority opinion, considers only the state’s speech – its compelled disclosures – and does not assess the rhetorical properties of NIFLA’s commercial communications. But the majority concludes nevertheless that NIFLA’s speech is impervious to publicly interested legislation, despite well-documented evidence of misleading and harmful advertising. Ultimately, it is argued that the question of whether NIFLA’s right to free speech has been violated cannot be squarely addressed if the speech with which the state’s disclosures dialogue remains nebulous. NIFLA seems to undermine the longstanding conception of commercial speech as a form that legitimates both the interests of speakers and the informational interests of publics, with the latter sustained when necessary by governmental initiatives that enable informed choice-making by regulating deceptive information in commercial marketplaces.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":"54 1","pages":"71 - 92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"First Amendment Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT This essay responds to the holding in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra (2018), arguing that the signal contribution of the majority opinion is its attempt to move commercial speech further into the absolute realm of protected public discourse. In finding the California FACT Act to be unconstitutional, the 5–4 majority uses a fractured commercial speech standard to define NIFLA’s marketplace communications as protected ideological speech. In so doing, Justice Thomas, author of the majority opinion, considers only the state’s speech – its compelled disclosures – and does not assess the rhetorical properties of NIFLA’s commercial communications. But the majority concludes nevertheless that NIFLA’s speech is impervious to publicly interested legislation, despite well-documented evidence of misleading and harmful advertising. Ultimately, it is argued that the question of whether NIFLA’s right to free speech has been violated cannot be squarely addressed if the speech with which the state’s disclosures dialogue remains nebulous. NIFLA seems to undermine the longstanding conception of commercial speech as a form that legitimates both the interests of speakers and the informational interests of publics, with the latter sustained when necessary by governmental initiatives that enable informed choice-making by regulating deceptive information in commercial marketplaces.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
第一修正案诉生殖权利:危机怀孕中心、商业言论和错误信息市场
摘要本文回应了美国国家家庭与生活倡导者协会(NIFLA)诉Becerra(2018)一案的判决,认为多数意见的标志性贡献是它试图将商业言论进一步带入受保护的公共话语的绝对领域。在认定《加州事实真相法案》违宪的过程中,5–4的多数人使用了一个支离破碎的商业言论标准,将NIFLA的市场传播定义为受保护的意识形态言论。在这样做的时候,多数意见书的作者托马斯大法官只考虑了该州的言论——其强制披露——而没有评估NIFLA商业通信的修辞性质。但大多数人得出的结论是,尽管有充分的证据表明存在误导和有害的广告,但NIFLA的言论不受公众关注的立法的影响。最终,有人认为,如果国家披露对话所用的言论仍然模糊不清,那么NIFLA的言论自由权是否受到侵犯的问题就无法得到正视。NIFLA似乎破坏了商业言论的长期概念,商业言论是一种使演讲者的利益和公众的信息利益合法化的形式,后者在必要时通过政府举措得以维持,通过监管商业市场中的欺骗性信息来实现知情选择。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
First Amendment Studies
First Amendment Studies Social Sciences-Law
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: First Amendment Studies publishes original scholarship on all aspects of free speech and embraces the full range of critical, historical, empirical, and descriptive methodologies. First Amendment Studies welcomes scholarship addressing areas including but not limited to: • doctrinal analysis of international and national free speech law and legislation • rhetorical analysis of cases and judicial rhetoric • theoretical and cultural issues related to free speech • the role of free speech in a wide variety of contexts (e.g., organizations, popular culture, traditional and new media).
期刊最新文献
The digital citizen as technoliberal subject: The politics of constitutive rhetoric in the European Union’s Digital Decade The Supreme Court’s rhetorical construction of home On the censoring of Dr. Ahlam Muhtaseb An accounting from Dr. Ahlam Muhtaseb The rhetoric of democracy in United States Senate campaign debates
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1