Relational personhood: a conception of legal personhood with insights from disability rights and environmental law

IF 1.3 Q1 LAW Griffith Law Review Pub Date : 2021-07-03 DOI:10.1080/10383441.2021.2003744
Anna Arstein-Kerslake, E. O’Donnell, Rosemary Kayess, Joanne M Watson
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

ABSTRACT People with disability have demanded the recognition of full legal personhood in order to realise their rights and to overcome dominance and oppression. Legal personhood is also being claimed for similar reasons for natural entities, including rivers, forests, and mountains. However, the prevailing neo-liberal understanding of legal personhood relies on the individual exercising personhood independently. This may not be enough to secure the interests and realise the rights of people with disability, natural entities, or other cohorts that are not experiencing a wealth of power and privilege. In this article, we attempt to overcome centuries of (white, able-bodied, cis gender) male centric theory of legal personhood. We reject the dominant conceptions of personhood from liberal political theory that emphasise an atomistic, isolated individual making independent decisions. Instead, we argue for a different conception of legal personhood – relational personhood. We use insights from feminist theories of relational autonomy as well as the experience of disability to help us re-conceptualise personhood to embrace exercising autonomy through a collaborative process of acknowledging, interpreting and acting on an individual’s expressions of will and preference. We then apply this new conception to the recognition of legal personhood in nature and explore how natural entities can exercise their personhood via their relationships with humans – and, in particular, Indigenous Peoples, who have developed close relationships with natural entities over centuries. Our aim is to demonstrate the utility of a conception of legal personhood that encompass the reality of the interdependence of all individuals and entities.
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关系人格:从残疾人权利和环境法看法律人格的概念
残障人士要求承认完全的法律人格,以实现他们的权利,克服统治和压迫。江河、森林、山川等自然实体也因类似的理由被要求具有法人资格。然而,流行的新自由主义对法律人格的理解依赖于个人独立行使人格。这可能不足以确保残疾人、自然实体或其他没有经历大量权力和特权的群体的利益和权利。在这篇文章中,我们试图克服几个世纪以来(白人,健全,顺性)男性中心的法律人格理论。我们反对自由主义政治理论中占主导地位的人格概念,这些概念强调一个原子的、孤立的个人做出独立的决定。相反,我们主张一种不同的法律人格概念——关系人格。我们利用女性主义的关系自主理论以及残疾经验来帮助我们重新定义人格,通过承认、解释和根据个人意愿和偏好的表达采取行动的合作过程来拥抱行使自主权。然后,我们将这一新概念应用于承认自然界的法律人格,并探索自然实体如何通过与人类的关系,特别是与土著人民的关系来行使其人格,几个世纪以来,土著人民与自然实体建立了密切的关系。我们的目的是证明包含所有个人和实体相互依存这一现实的法律人格概念的效用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
8.30%
发文量
25
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