Risky rescues revisited

Abstract

ABSTRACT This essay replies to Phillip Reichling’s recent article in this journal defending a principle of rescue I proposed, but rejected, in my paper, ‘Climbing high and letting die’ (2021). I argued that ‘the comparable risk principle’ imposes unreasonable demands on adventure sport athletes, for it implies that because they assume substantial risks for sport, they have duties to assume comparable risks to rescue others – duties that would otherwise be supererogatory precisely because of the risks involved. Reichling (2022) defends the principle and contends that once these athletes have assumed substantial risks for sport, they cannot reasonably claim that a rescue that involves comparable risks is too risky. I argue here, however, that Reichling fails to recognize that one can have good personal reasons for assuming risks that do not prevent one from reasonably citing comparable risks as a justification for not rescuing others. So although adventure sport athletes assume risks for personal reasons, it does not follow that they have a duty to assume comparable risks to rescue others. Reichling’s defence of the comparable risk principle is therefore unsuccessful.