{"title":"CFOs versus CEOs: Risk-taking incentives and decisions of corporate policies","authors":"Han‐Ching Huang, P. Tung","doi":"10.1080/10293523.2021.2010373","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of the equity incentives of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) on decisions relating to corporate policies and find that the risk-taking incentives of acquirer CEOs have a greater impact on the probability that firms conduct an acquisition than CFOs, extending the argument that higher risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake more investments. Higher risk-decreasing incentives are associated with greater probability of firms conducting repurchases and seasoned equity issues (SEOs). Specifically, compared with CEOs, the risk-taking incentives of CFOs induce greater probability that firms conduct repurchases and SEOs.","PeriodicalId":44496,"journal":{"name":"Investment Analysts Journal","volume":"50 1","pages":"209 - 226"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Investment Analysts Journal","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10293523.2021.2010373","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
ABSTRACT We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of the equity incentives of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) on decisions relating to corporate policies and find that the risk-taking incentives of acquirer CEOs have a greater impact on the probability that firms conduct an acquisition than CFOs, extending the argument that higher risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake more investments. Higher risk-decreasing incentives are associated with greater probability of firms conducting repurchases and seasoned equity issues (SEOs). Specifically, compared with CEOs, the risk-taking incentives of CFOs induce greater probability that firms conduct repurchases and SEOs.
期刊介绍：
The Investment Analysts Journal is an international, peer-reviewed journal, publishing high-quality, original research three times a year. The journal publishes significant new research in finance and investments and seeks to establish a balance between theoretical and empirical studies. Papers written in any areas of finance, investment, accounting and economics will be considered for publication. All contributions are welcome but are subject to an objective selection procedure to ensure that published articles answer the criteria of scientific objectivity, importance and replicability. Readability and good writing style are important. No articles which have been published or are under review elsewhere will be considered. All submitted manuscripts are subject to initial appraisal by the Editor, and, if found suitable for further consideration, to peer review by independent, anonymous expert referees. All peer review is double blind and submission is via email. Accepted papers will then pass through originality checking software. The editors reserve the right to make the final decision with respect to publication.
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