Systematically Flogging the Wrong: EU Corporate Fines Violate the Fundamental Rights of Shareholders – The European Commission as Revenant of the Persian Great King Xerxes

Abstract

EU fines are imposed on companies, not managers. Economically, they hit the shareholders. Yet, the shareholders have typically not participated in the company’s wrongdoings, and corporate law often cuts-off shareholders from management. This article submits that the Commission’s corporate fines thus disproportionately restrict shareholders‘ rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: As corporate fines are manifestly unsuitable to reach their purpose, hit the wrong and hence do not „strike the right balance“, they are incompatible with the Charter. The increased significance of shares for citizens’ personal financial autonomy and old age provision resulting from the ECB’s low interest policy and the EU’s mushrooming fine amounts corroborate this finding. Corporate fines, deterrent, purpose of corporate fines, shares, shareholders, fundamental rights, proportionality, suitability, restriction of rights, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights