Defending business interests in Russia: collective action and social investments as bargaining chips

Abstract

ABSTRACT The collective organization of business interests in Russia is commonly considered weak. In some cases, however, business associations have succeeded in representing interests vis-à-vis the state. This article analyses an illustrative case of state–business negotiations regarding an extra profit tax for several chemical and metallurgical companies, proposed by the presidential administration in August 2018. Based on a case study involving media and interview data, the study examines the role of collective action under the auspices of the ‘Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs’ (RUIE) in defending business interests. It identifies the necessary conditions under which collective action was effective in this specific case, and critically discusses the possible contingency of the given constellation in light of inherently asymmetrical relations between state and business actors. Furthermore, the article develops an analytical framework with which business associations and their lobbying activities under authoritarian capitalism can be analysed beyond the Russian case.