下载PDF
{"title":"Totality","authors":"Carl Einstein","doi":"10.1162/016228704322790926","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"OCTOBER 107, Winter 2004, pp. 115–121. © 2004 October Magazine, Ltd. and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Totality” © 2004 Fannei & Walz Verlag, Berlin. Published in three installments in Die Aktion, a freewheeling left-wing journal edited by his brother-in-law Franz Pfemfert, Carl Einstein’s “Totality” essay is one of the most hermetic texts from a century that had no shortage of them. Part of its hermeticism is owed to the fact that it is at once fiercely nondiscursive and intensely referential. The essay’s argument is apodictic; it does not name names, and yet it is deeply engaged in contemporary philosophical debates in order to make its case, a case for visual art as a totality that would work to disrupt models of subjectivity, which hinge on a subject’s experience of art as visual knowledge. To make matters more complicated, “Totality” is animated by a deep tension that is ultimately not resolved but rather internalizes the very qualitative difference which, according to the text, is the enabling condition of any totality—including “Totality” itself. This tension is generated by a clash between two heterogeneous intellectual resources: a number of aggressively transcendental neo-Kantian philosophemes on one hand, a Bergsonian vitalism of immanence on the other. The neo-Kantian part of the argument, most noticeable in sections I and II, tries to merge a radicalized Fiedlerian autonomy aesthetic with a critique of the Marburg School’s (neo-Kantian) “transcendental logic” even as it endorses that school’s crit ique of late-nineteenth-century (neo-Kantian) “psychologism.” Einstein, that is to say, rejects the idea that a work of art is a form of knowledge that is grounded in spatio-temporal categories—whether those are considered intellectual a prioris, as Immanuel Kant had claimed, or are thought to be incorporated in the subject as the very structure of embodied perception, as Hermann von Helmholtz had argued. If art is a totality, this totality is not the unity of the spatio-temporal manifold. But Einstein goes on to reject the claims of Marburg","PeriodicalId":51557,"journal":{"name":"OCTOBER","volume":"1 1","pages":"115-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1162/016228704322790926","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"OCTOBER","FirstCategoryId":"1092","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/016228704322790926","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
引用
批量引用
合计
10月107日,2004年冬季,第115-121页。©2004 October Magazine, Ltd.和麻省理工学院。《总体性》©2004柏林范尼与华尔兹出版社。《行动》是一本自由的左翼杂志,由卡尔·爱因斯坦的姐夫弗朗茨·普芬费特编辑。卡尔·爱因斯坦的《总体性》论文分三期发表在该杂志上,是一个世纪以来最神秘的文章之一。它的神秘主义的部分原因在于,它既是非话语性的,又具有强烈的指称性。这篇文章的论点是绝对的;它没有点名,但它深入参与了当代哲学辩论,以证明自己的观点,即视觉艺术作为一个整体,将努力破坏主体性模式,主体性模式依赖于主体作为视觉知识的艺术体验。更复杂的是,《总体性》被一种深层的张力所激发,这种张力最终没有得到解决,而是内化了本质上的差异,根据文本,这种差异是任何总体性——包括《总体性》本身——的有利条件。这种紧张是由两种异质智力资源之间的冲突产生的:一方面是一些激进的先验新康德哲学,另一方面是伯格斯的内在活力论。论证的新康德主义部分,在第一节和第二节中最引人注目,试图将激进的费勒式自治美学与对马尔堡学派(新康德主义)“先验逻辑”的批判结合起来,即使它赞同该学派对19世纪晚期(新康德主义)“心理主义”的批判。也就是说,爱因斯坦反对这样一种观点,即艺术作品是一种建立在时空范畴基础上的知识形式——不管这些范畴是像伊曼努尔·康德所说的那样被认为是智力上的先验,还是像赫尔曼·冯·亥姆霍兹所说的那样被认为是作为具身知觉的结构被纳入主体。如果艺术是一个整体,那么这个整体就不是时空歧义的统一。但是爱因斯坦继续拒绝了马尔堡的说法
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。