Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews

Abstract

Abstract This paper provides descriptive evidence on voluntary firm disclosures related to enforcement reviews. Our analyses are set in the German institutional environment, where firms are mandated to disclose error announcements if enforcement institutions, after conclusion of the review, formally establish financial statements to contain material errors. We find that firms provide voluntary disclosures about ongoing enforcement reviews on rare occasions while they opt to disclose information about concluded reviews more frequently. Content analyses reveal that the format of disclosures about ongoing reviews is potentially associated with the eventual review outcome, which is consistent with firms deliberately using these disclosures. This interpretation is supported by additional multivariate analyses of disclosures relating to ongoing reviews, which turn out more likely for contentious reviews. Analysis of market reactions provides weak evidence that investors price these disclosures, as negative market responses to the disclosure of error findings are mitigated. Hence, our paper provides a novel angle on the growing literature on accounting enforcement and yields insights into firm-level incentives for strategic disclosures.