PRESIDENTS AND THE CONDITIONAL CORE-SWING TARGETING OF THE NATIONAL SUBSIDY IN SOUTH KOREA, 1989–2018

IF 1.2 3区 社会学 Q2 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY Journal of East Asian Studies Pub Date : 2021-10-22 DOI:10.1017/jea.2021.22
W. Kim
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I present a theory of conditional core-swing targeting that focuses on the competition for majority control in legislative elections to explain how presidents use their strong budgetary powers to manipulate the distribution of the national subsidy in South Korea. Presidents whose parties already possess a legislative majority are expected to favor core municipalities to strengthen the foundations of their majority constituency, whereas those who seek majority control are predicted to prioritize swing municipalities in an effort to cross the majority threshold. Presidents are also anticipated to respond to the electoral cycle by shifting subsidies to riskier municipalities when elections approach. Using a novel data set on national subsidy allocations that spans three decades, I find evidence in favor of the hypotheses. This article demonstrates that the beneficiaries of distributive favoritism are not fixed, and that politicians can engage in complex and varied targeting strategies to achieve their objectives.
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1989-2018年韩国总统和有条件的核心国家补贴目标
摘要在这篇文章中,我提出了一个有条件的核心摇摆目标理论,该理论侧重于在立法选举中争夺多数控制权,以解释总统如何利用其强大的预算权力操纵韩国的国家补贴分配。政党已经拥有立法多数席位的总统预计会支持核心市镇,以加强其多数选区的基础,而那些寻求多数控制权的总统预计将优先考虑摇摆市镇,努力跨越多数席位的门槛。预计总统还将在选举临近时将补贴转移到风险较高的市政当局,以应对选举周期。使用一组跨越三十年的关于国家补贴分配的新数据,我发现了支持这些假设的证据。这篇文章表明,分配偏袒的受益者不是固定的,政治家可以采取复杂多样的目标策略来实现他们的目标。
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来源期刊
Journal of East Asian Studies
Journal of East Asian Studies SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
15.40%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: Experts from around the globe come together in this important peer-reviewed forum to present compelling social science research on the entire East Asia region. Topics include democratic governance, military security, political culture, economic cooperation, human rights, and environmental concerns. Thought-provoking book reviews enhance each issue. Want more information information on Journal of East Asian Studies? Sign up for our E-Alerts for regular updates.
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