{"title":"PRESIDENTS AND THE CONDITIONAL CORE-SWING TARGETING OF THE NATIONAL SUBSIDY IN SOUTH KOREA, 1989–2018","authors":"W. Kim","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.22","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I present a theory of conditional core-swing targeting that focuses on the competition for majority control in legislative elections to explain how presidents use their strong budgetary powers to manipulate the distribution of the national subsidy in South Korea. Presidents whose parties already possess a legislative majority are expected to favor core municipalities to strengthen the foundations of their majority constituency, whereas those who seek majority control are predicted to prioritize swing municipalities in an effort to cross the majority threshold. Presidents are also anticipated to respond to the electoral cycle by shifting subsidies to riskier municipalities when elections approach. Using a novel data set on national subsidy allocations that spans three decades, I find evidence in favor of the hypotheses. This article demonstrates that the beneficiaries of distributive favoritism are not fixed, and that politicians can engage in complex and varied targeting strategies to achieve their objectives.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of East Asian Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.22","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Abstract In this article, I present a theory of conditional core-swing targeting that focuses on the competition for majority control in legislative elections to explain how presidents use their strong budgetary powers to manipulate the distribution of the national subsidy in South Korea. Presidents whose parties already possess a legislative majority are expected to favor core municipalities to strengthen the foundations of their majority constituency, whereas those who seek majority control are predicted to prioritize swing municipalities in an effort to cross the majority threshold. Presidents are also anticipated to respond to the electoral cycle by shifting subsidies to riskier municipalities when elections approach. Using a novel data set on national subsidy allocations that spans three decades, I find evidence in favor of the hypotheses. This article demonstrates that the beneficiaries of distributive favoritism are not fixed, and that politicians can engage in complex and varied targeting strategies to achieve their objectives.
期刊介绍:
Experts from around the globe come together in this important peer-reviewed forum to present compelling social science research on the entire East Asia region. Topics include democratic governance, military security, political culture, economic cooperation, human rights, and environmental concerns. Thought-provoking book reviews enhance each issue. Want more information information on Journal of East Asian Studies? Sign up for our E-Alerts for regular updates.