The behavioural logics of international public servants: the case of African Union Commission staff

Abstract

Although international organisations (IOs) are created by governments, their international public administrations (IPAs) have succeeded in ring-fencing their resources, and policymaking from direct intervention by member states. Research shows that international civil servants are best able to protect their autonomy when embedded in large and well-resourced IPAs. Staff in large IOs use their huge size, bureaucratic complexities, and different behavioural logics to protect their autonomy and thereby leave a ‘ bureaucratic footprint ’ in international affairs. Whereas the behavioural logics of large IPAs, mostly headquartered in the Global North, are reasonably well-documented, not much has been written on behavioural logics of international civil servants embedded in small secretariats. We seek to address the gap using the African Union Commission (AUC) staff. Drawing insights from organisational theory and mixed research methods, including the first ever comprehensive survey of AUC staff, the study finds that the AUC staff primarily evoke a departmental behavioural logic. In the absence of departmental logics, the preference of AUC staff is to take on supranational, transnational, and lastly intergovernmental persona. The reluctance of AUC staff to evoke intergovernmental logic is surprising given that the AUC is embedded in an intergovernmental governance architecture.