Bank risk-taking in a mixed duopoly: The role of the state-owned bank

IF 1.8 4区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE International Review of Finance Pub Date : 2021-09-08 DOI:10.1111/irfi.12366
Ping-Lun Tseng, Wen-Chung Guo
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We analyze the role of a state-owned bank, whose objective is to maximize social welfare, in a credit market with a mixed duopoly. The equilibrium reveals that the state-owned bank is exposed to lower credit risk than the private bank. Furthermore, when the deposit rate is raised by the monetary authority, both banks exert socially beneficial higher monitoring efforts. In modified models, we explore the effects of the cost-inefficiency and the political view of the state-owned bank. Extensions on partial nationalization, mixed oligopoly with multiple private banks, and the case of loan differentiation with price competition are also discussed.

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混合双头垄断中的银行风险承担:国有银行的作用
本文分析了以社会福利最大化为目标的国有银行在混合双寡头信贷市场中的作用。均衡表明,国有银行的信用风险低于民营银行。此外,当货币当局提高存款利率时,两家银行都施加了有利于社会的更高监管力度。在修正的模型中,我们探讨了国有银行的成本效率低下和政治观点的影响。本文还讨论了部分国有化的延伸、多家私人银行的混合寡头垄断以及价格竞争下的贷款差异化情况。
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来源期刊
International Review of Finance
International Review of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
5.90%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The International Review of Finance (IRF) publishes high-quality research on all aspects of financial economics, including traditional areas such as asset pricing, corporate finance, market microstructure, financial intermediation and regulation, financial econometrics, financial engineering and risk management, as well as new areas such as markets and institutions of emerging market economies, especially those in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the Letters Section in IRF is a premium outlet of letter-length research in all fields of finance. The length of the articles in the Letters Section is limited to a maximum of eight journal pages.
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