The Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Christian Apophaticism

Abstract

This study provides an original theological interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) Transcendental Unity of Apperception in light of Nicholas of Cusa’s (1401–1464) apophaticism. The study will show that Kant’s Transcendental Unity contains a thoroughly anti-theological premise. This is namely that our own ‘I think’ grounds the distinction between the transcendent (that which we think but don’t know) and immanent (that which we know). This premise is then contrasted with Cusa’s conception whereby the distinction is grounded in the transcendent itself. Whilst for Kant our thought itself produces the distinction between ‘thinking’ (Denken) and ‘knowing’ (Erkennen), for Cusa the distinction between ‘knowing that’ (quia est), and ‘knowing what’ (quid est) is produced by God himself.