On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI:10.14394/filnau.2019.0015
M. Zouhar
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

It is possible to construct situations (with a suitable kind of setting) in which one speaker utters “This is tasty” and another one responds with “That’s not true.” The aim of this paper is to motivate the idea that typical (broadly) expressivist accounts of taste disagreements are unable to explain such situations (although some of them can successfully explain disagreements in which another kind of dissent phrase — like “Nuh-uh” — is employed). This is because utterances of “That’s not true” are typically used to ascribe falsehood to propositions. Taste expressivism has it, however, that when one utters “This is tasty,” one typically manifests her evaluative attitude (which is non-propositional) toward something rather than describes what attitude she bears toward that thing. Another aim of the paper consists in proposing an alternative account of taste disagreements. It is close to taste expressivism in the case of disagreements in which speakers respond with “Nuh-uh” but departs from it in situations in which they respond with “That’s not true.” The account is developed within a contextualist framework according to which taste utterances express contextually enriched propositions that contain judges who evaluate things as tasty or not.
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论味觉表达论的不足
可以构建这样的情景(在适当的环境下),一个说话者说出“这很美味”,另一个说话者回答“这不是真的”。“这篇论文的目的是激发这样一种观点,即典型的(广泛的)表达主义者对品味分歧的描述无法解释这种情况(尽管其中一些可以成功地解释使用了另一种异议短语——比如“Nuh uh”——的分歧)。这是因为“那不是真的”的话语通常被用来将虚假归因于命题。然而,味觉表达主义认为,当一个人说出“这很美味”时,通常会表现出她对某件事的评价态度(这是非命题的),而不是描述她对那件事的态度。这篇论文的另一个目的是提出一种对品味分歧的替代解释。在分歧的情况下,说话者用“Nuh uh”回应,但在他们用“That not true”回应的情况下则偏离了味觉表达主义。该叙述是在语境主义框架内发展起来的,根据该框架,味觉话语表达了丰富的语境命题,其中包含了评价事物是否美味的评判者。
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来源期刊
Filozofia Nauki
Filozofia Nauki PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science) is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic quarterly published by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It publishes articles, notes, and reviews covering the whole range of analytic philosophy, including among others: epistemology, ontology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy. We invite papers not only from professional philosophers but also from specialists in different areas, interested in generalizing their scientific experiences towards more foundational issues.
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