Frederico Batista Pereira, Guilherme A. Russo, Felipe Nunes
{"title":"Who Is Responsible for the Emergency Aid? Cash Transfer and Presidential Approval During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil","authors":"Frederico Batista Pereira, Guilherme A. Russo, Felipe Nunes","doi":"10.1017/lap.2023.17","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Studies show that cash transfer programs increase incumbent approval through their financial impact and clear association with the executive. But does this effect hold when it is the legislature rather than the incumbent proposing the program? Amid the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, more than 60 million Brazilians received an emergency assistance payment that was proposed by Congress against resistance from the executive. This study leverages this unique case to examine if cash transfer programs affect presidential approval under circumstances of unclear responsibility. Survey results showed that while approval ratings increased, the public was divided about who was responsible for the program. Moreover, a survey-experiment that informed respondents about the negotiations between the president and Congress found that information improves views about Congress but does not affect presidential approval. The results suggest that even cash transfer programs may promote limited vertical accountability in contexts of unclear policy responsibility.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Latin American Politics and Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2023.17","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Studies show that cash transfer programs increase incumbent approval through their financial impact and clear association with the executive. But does this effect hold when it is the legislature rather than the incumbent proposing the program? Amid the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, more than 60 million Brazilians received an emergency assistance payment that was proposed by Congress against resistance from the executive. This study leverages this unique case to examine if cash transfer programs affect presidential approval under circumstances of unclear responsibility. Survey results showed that while approval ratings increased, the public was divided about who was responsible for the program. Moreover, a survey-experiment that informed respondents about the negotiations between the president and Congress found that information improves views about Congress but does not affect presidential approval. The results suggest that even cash transfer programs may promote limited vertical accountability in contexts of unclear policy responsibility.
期刊介绍:
Latin American Politics and Society publishes the highest-quality original social science scholarship on Latin America. The Editorial Board, comprising leading U.S., Latin American, and European scholars, is dedicated to challenging prevailing orthodoxies and promoting innovative theoretical and methodological perspectives on the states, societies, economies, and international relations of the Americas in a globalizing world.