Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities

IF 1.1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MONIST Pub Date : 2020-06-17 DOI:10.1093/monist/onaa002
H. Beebee, Maria Svedberg, Ann Whittle
{"title":"Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities","authors":"H. Beebee, Maria Svedberg, Ann Whittle","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n In an outline of a paper found amongst his philosophical papers and correspondence after his untimely death in 2001—“Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” reproduced in this volume—David Lewis sketched a new compatibilist account of abilities, according to which someone is able to A if and only if there is no obstacle to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a ‘robust preventer’ of their A-ing. In this paper, we provide some background context for Lewis’s outline, a section-by-section commentary, and a general discussion of the account’s main features.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa002","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"MONIST","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa002","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

In an outline of a paper found amongst his philosophical papers and correspondence after his untimely death in 2001—“Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” reproduced in this volume—David Lewis sketched a new compatibilist account of abilities, according to which someone is able to A if and only if there is no obstacle to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a ‘robust preventer’ of their A-ing. In this paper, we provide some background context for Lewis’s outline, a section-by-section commentary, and a general discussion of the account’s main features.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Nihil Obstat: Lewis的能力相容论
在他2001年英年早逝后,在他的哲学论文和信件中发现了一篇论文的提纲——“Nihil Obstat: a Analysis of Ability”,在本卷中复制——大卫·刘易斯(david Lewis)概述了一种新的能力相容论,根据这种理论,一个人能够获得a,当且仅当他们的a -ing没有障碍,而障碍是他们的a -ing的“强有力的阻止者”。在本文中,我们为刘易斯的提纲提供了一些背景,逐节评论,并对该帐户的主要特征进行了一般性讨论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
MONIST
MONIST PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
期刊最新文献
Disingenuous Infallibilism Knowledge-First Inferential Evidence: A Response to Dunn How Infallibilists Can Have It All How Not to Be a Fallibilist Really Knowing: A Collocational Argument for an Infallibilist Sense of ‘Know’
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1