{"title":"Judging care proceedings – ‘it’s not what you do it’s the way that you do it’","authors":"J. Masson","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2136703","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Re H-W [2022] UKSC 17 the Supreme Court examined the standards for decisionmaking and proportionality in care cases, revisiting an area thoroughly considered in and after Munby P’s decision in Re B-S (Children)(Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and creating a bright line for the test for appeals. In a single judgement, it held that it was no longer enough for judges to do the right thing i.e. not be wrong, they must now make decisions in the right way. Failure to consider all the court’s powers (Children Act 1989, s.1(3)(g)), comparing each option, holistically, with all the others as set out by McFarlane LJ in Re G (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 was fatal. There were no allowances for experience of first instance judges, extempore judgements or the pressure of making decisions in the family court. At a stroke the Supreme Court imposed a more stringent test for proportionality in care cases; a decision could only be upheld where the judge’s reasoning fully explained why all other options for mitigating risks and securing welfare, not just realistic ones, have been rejected. Decision-making was not only about substance but also structure and form (cf Munby P in Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, paras 18 and 68). A summary of the facts There was a long history of neglect and sexual abuse in the mother’s extended family. In care proceedings in 2013, her son, A, was found to have abused her daughters B and C, and F2, the father of her youngest daughter, E, was found to have had a sexually abusive relationship with the mother, starting in her early teens. The court made a care order for A who was and placed in foster care; residence and supervision orders for B, C, D and E, who remained with their mother. F2ʹs application for residence of E was rejected and an injunction made preventing him entering the family home. Although the supervision orders expired in 2015, the local authority remained involved with M and her current partner, F3. In 2016, there were care proceedings in respect of F3ʹs children who, with the exception of G, were living with their mother; G was made subject of child arrangements and supervision orders to live with F3, but the placement broke down and G went into care. The local authority conducted family assessments in 2016/17 but M did not tell them that she had taken B for a week’s holiday with F2, where they had all shared a chalet, information that only emerged in the latest care proceedings. Child protection plans for","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"533 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2136703","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In Re H-W [2022] UKSC 17 the Supreme Court examined the standards for decisionmaking and proportionality in care cases, revisiting an area thoroughly considered in and after Munby P’s decision in Re B-S (Children)(Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and creating a bright line for the test for appeals. In a single judgement, it held that it was no longer enough for judges to do the right thing i.e. not be wrong, they must now make decisions in the right way. Failure to consider all the court’s powers (Children Act 1989, s.1(3)(g)), comparing each option, holistically, with all the others as set out by McFarlane LJ in Re G (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 was fatal. There were no allowances for experience of first instance judges, extempore judgements or the pressure of making decisions in the family court. At a stroke the Supreme Court imposed a more stringent test for proportionality in care cases; a decision could only be upheld where the judge’s reasoning fully explained why all other options for mitigating risks and securing welfare, not just realistic ones, have been rejected. Decision-making was not only about substance but also structure and form (cf Munby P in Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, paras 18 and 68). A summary of the facts There was a long history of neglect and sexual abuse in the mother’s extended family. In care proceedings in 2013, her son, A, was found to have abused her daughters B and C, and F2, the father of her youngest daughter, E, was found to have had a sexually abusive relationship with the mother, starting in her early teens. The court made a care order for A who was and placed in foster care; residence and supervision orders for B, C, D and E, who remained with their mother. F2ʹs application for residence of E was rejected and an injunction made preventing him entering the family home. Although the supervision orders expired in 2015, the local authority remained involved with M and her current partner, F3. In 2016, there were care proceedings in respect of F3ʹs children who, with the exception of G, were living with their mother; G was made subject of child arrangements and supervision orders to live with F3, but the placement broke down and G went into care. The local authority conducted family assessments in 2016/17 but M did not tell them that she had taken B for a week’s holiday with F2, where they had all shared a chalet, information that only emerged in the latest care proceedings. Child protection plans for
在Re H-W [2022] UKSC 17中,最高法院审查了护理案件中的决策和比例标准,重新审视了Munby P在Re B-S(儿童)(收养令:反对许可)[2013]EWCA Civ 1146中的决定中和之后彻底考虑的领域,并为上诉测试创造了一条清晰的界限。在一个单一的判决中,它认为法官仅仅做正确的事(即不犯错)已经不够了,他们现在必须以正确的方式做出决定。未能考虑到法院的所有权力(1989年《儿童法案》第1(3)(g)条),将每个选项与McFarlane LJ在Re g (A Child)(护理程序:福利评估)[2013]EWCA Civ 965中所规定的所有其他选项进行整体比较是致命的。没有考虑到初审法官的经验、临时判决或在家事法庭作出裁决的压力。最高法院一下子对护理案件的比例性实施了更严格的检验;只有当法官的推理充分解释了为什么所有其他减轻风险和确保福利的选择都被拒绝,而不仅仅是现实的选择,一个决定才能得到维持。决策不仅涉及内容,还涉及结构和形式(参见Munby P in Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625,第18和68段)。在这位母亲的大家庭中,长期以来一直存在忽视和性虐待的现象。在2013年的看护程序中,她的儿子A被发现虐待女儿B和C,她最小的女儿E的父亲F2被发现从她十几岁的时候就开始与母亲发生性虐待关系。法院对被寄养的a作出照料令;对B、C、D和E的居留和监管令,他们仍与母亲在一起。F2的居留申请被拒绝,并发出禁令,禁止他进入家庭住宅。尽管监管令于2015年到期,但当地政府仍与M及其现任伴侣F3有关系。2016年,对35名儿童进行了照料程序,除G外,这些儿童与母亲生活在一起;G受到儿童安排和监督令的约束,与F3一起生活,但安置破裂,G进入了护理中心。当地政府在2016/17年度进行了家庭评估,但M没有告诉他们她带B和F2一起度假一周,他们在那里共享一个小木屋,这些信息直到最近的护理程序中才出现。儿童保护计划
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law is concerned with social and family law and policy in a UK, European and international context. The policy of the Editors and of the Editorial Board is to provide an interdisciplinary forum to which academics and professionals working in the social welfare and related fields may turn for guidance, comment and informed debate. Features: •Articles •Cases •European Section •Current Development •Ombudsman"s Section •Book Reviews