The Rise of Multiple-Measures Rules in the House of Representatives

Scott R. Meinke
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract Through most of the modern partisan era, the House Rules Committee adhered to a norm of One Measure, One Rule. Starting in the 1990s, majorities violated this norm on rare occasions, but after 2010, multiple-measures rules became commonplace. This paper argues that multiple, sometimes competing objectives—majority messaging, member position-taking opportunities, and managing limited floor time—motivate the majority’s use of this creative rule. Bills in multiple-measures rules since 2010 have been more majority-unifying and divisive between the parties, and bills appear more in these rules as some time constraints increase. Bills sponsored by rank-and-file members, as compared to committee chairs, are also more likely to be included in multiple-measures packages. A special case of the multiple-measures rule, the bifurcated rule, also governs measures with heightened partisan conflict, and it allows the majority to navigate coalition problems creatively under certain conditions. The multiple-measures trend highlights how the majority continues to evolve special rules to pursue multiple goals under constraints, and it raises important questions about the way these tactics limit floor consideration of procedure.
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众议院多重措施规则的兴起
在大多数现代党派时代,众议院规则委员会坚持一项措施,一项规则的规范。从上世纪90年代开始,多数人偶尔会违反这一规范,但在2010年之后,多重措施规则变得司空见惯。本文认为,多个(有时是相互竞争的)目标——多数人的信息传递、成员的立场把握机会和管理有限的发言时间——促使多数人使用这一创造性规则。自2010年以来,多措施规则中的法案更倾向于多数统一和政党之间的分歧,随着一些时间限制的增加,这些规则中的法案出现得更多。与委员会主席提出的议案相比,由普通议员提出的议案更有可能被纳入多措施方案。多措施规则的一个特例,即分岔规则,也适用于党派冲突加剧的措施,它允许多数党在某些条件下创造性地解决联盟问题。多措施趋势突出了多数人如何继续发展特殊规则,以在约束下追求多个目标,并提出了关于这些策略如何限制对程序的充分考虑的重要问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
期刊最新文献
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