{"title":"Dignity and Social Meaning: Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence as Constitutional Dialogue","authors":"S. Sanders","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3153661","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s three most important gay and lesbian rights decisions – Obergefell v. Hodges, United States v. Windsor, and Lawrence v. Texas – are united by the principle that gays and lesbians are entitled to dignity. Beyond their tangible consequences, the common constitutional evil of state bans on same-sex marriage, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, and sodomy laws was that they imposed dignitary harm. \nThis Article explores how the gay and lesbian dignity cases exemplify the process by which constitutional law emerges from a social and cultural dialogue in which the Supreme Court actively participates. In doing so, it draws on the scholarly literatures on dialogic judicial review and the role of social meaning in constitutional law. It illuminates how the Supreme Court interprets democratic preferences and constructs social meaning in order to apply fundamental Constitutional norms to emerging legal claims. \nContrary to the speculations of some commentators, “dignity” in these cases did not operate as some new form of constitutional right. Rather, the identification and protection of dignitary interests served as the unifying principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over thirteen years, through which constitutional law was brought into alignment with evolving public attitudes and policy preferences. The dignity decisions should be understood as majoritarian, not acts of judicial will. They were broadly accepted, because the Court’s insights about the status of gays and lesbians in American society were consistent with dramatic and long-term changes in culture and public attitudes. As culture and attitudes evolved, so did the social meaning of anti-gay laws. Sodomy laws and marriage restrictions, once accepted as presumptively constitutional protections of tradition and public morality, increasingly came be understood as impositions of stigma and humiliation -- the kind of expressive harms that the Constitution forbids.","PeriodicalId":47517,"journal":{"name":"Fordham Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Fordham Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3153661","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s three most important gay and lesbian rights decisions – Obergefell v. Hodges, United States v. Windsor, and Lawrence v. Texas – are united by the principle that gays and lesbians are entitled to dignity. Beyond their tangible consequences, the common constitutional evil of state bans on same-sex marriage, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, and sodomy laws was that they imposed dignitary harm.
This Article explores how the gay and lesbian dignity cases exemplify the process by which constitutional law emerges from a social and cultural dialogue in which the Supreme Court actively participates. In doing so, it draws on the scholarly literatures on dialogic judicial review and the role of social meaning in constitutional law. It illuminates how the Supreme Court interprets democratic preferences and constructs social meaning in order to apply fundamental Constitutional norms to emerging legal claims.
Contrary to the speculations of some commentators, “dignity” in these cases did not operate as some new form of constitutional right. Rather, the identification and protection of dignitary interests served as the unifying principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over thirteen years, through which constitutional law was brought into alignment with evolving public attitudes and policy preferences. The dignity decisions should be understood as majoritarian, not acts of judicial will. They were broadly accepted, because the Court’s insights about the status of gays and lesbians in American society were consistent with dramatic and long-term changes in culture and public attitudes. As culture and attitudes evolved, so did the social meaning of anti-gay laws. Sodomy laws and marriage restrictions, once accepted as presumptively constitutional protections of tradition and public morality, increasingly came be understood as impositions of stigma and humiliation -- the kind of expressive harms that the Constitution forbids.
期刊介绍:
The Fordham Law Review is a scholarly journal serving the legal profession and the public by discussing current legal issues. Approximately 75 articles, written by students or submitted by outside authors, are published each year. Each volume comprises six books, three each semester, totaling over 3,000 pages. Managed by a board of up to eighteen student editors, the Law Review is a working journal, not merely an honor society. Nevertheless, Law Review membership is considered among the highest scholarly achievements at the Law School.