A Historical-Comparative Study of the Authorization of παρρησία in Philo’s Quis rerum divinarum heres sit and Quod omnis probus liber sit

Abstract

The article studies and compares how Philo authorizes παρρησία in Quis rerum divinarum heres sit and Quod omnis probus liber sit. After critically evaluating the scholarly literature on παρρησία in Philo, I go beyond the limitations of this literature by situating Philo’s views on παρρησία within the context of the ancient conventions of παρρησία, as well as in the changing socio-historical context of Philo’s writings. I argue that Philo creatively adapts the conventions of παρρησία to authorize that the Jews can have παρρησία towards God, as well as towards human beings within the Roman Empire. Their παρρησία is not authorized by citizenship, nobility of birth, good family reputation, and wealth, but by their conscience of having said and done everything to the benefit of God and their virtuous behavior according to Mosaic law.