Celia Álvarez-Botas, Carlos Fernández-Méndez, Víctor M. González
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引用次数: 6
Abstract
This paper analyzes the influence of large bank shareholders on the terms of bank loans for a sample of 12,045 loans to 3,290 borrowers from 45 countries over the period 2004–2013. We investigate the effects of bank control over bank loan terms during the global financial crisis, regardless of whether the bank shareholder is a lender or not. In line with a monitoring effect, the results suggest that firms with bank shareholders that are non-lenders borrowed at lower interest rates and longer maturities during the period of crisis. However, borrowers paid higher spreads and were offered shorter maturities when they borrowed from banks that are also shareholders. This effect is consistent with banks obtaining private benefits as large shareholders as a consequence of the informational hold-up problems affecting borrowers.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting publishes original research dealing with international aspects of financial management and reporting, banking and financial services, auditing and taxation. Providing a forum for the interaction of ideas from both academics and practitioners, the JIFMA keeps you up-to-date with new developments and emerging trends.