On the Epistemic Role of Our Passional Nature

Abstract

Can our passional nature play a legitimate epistemic role in our lives? In this article, we argue that John Henry Newman was right to think that our passional nature can indeed play such a role. First, we unpack the standard objection to Newman’s understanding of the relationship between our passional nature and the evidential basis of faith. We use “passional nature” as an umbrella term to cover the affective side of the person (passions, affections, emotions) that often bears on the pursuit of epistemic goods like true belief, knowledge, and wisdom. Second, we argue that the standard objection to Newman operates with a narrow definition of evidence (where evidence is synonymous with arguments and a third-person perspective). After challenging this notion, we then offer a broader and more humane understanding of evidence. Third, we survey recent scholarship arguing that emotions, a key aspect of our passional nature, are cognitive. In this light, they plausibly have a proper epistemic role. Fourth, we defend Newman’s reliance on the passional nature in epistemic matters by showing how reasonable it is in light of this recent work on evidence and the nature of emotions. Newman’s insistence that the formation of a right state of heart and mind is crucial for epistemic success is far from untenable.