Democratic Constitutions Against Democratization : Law and Administrative Reforms in Weimar Germany and Implications for New Democracies

Abstract

This study discusses the importance of bureaucracy in a state’s initial period of democratization. By examining the case of the Weimar Republic, this study argues that democratic constitutions and judicial independence can create a paradoxical situation wherein democracy itself permits the development of anti-democratic sentiment and action within state institutions. The democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic restrained the regime’s efforts to reform the undemocratic institutions of the state and eventually had a detrimental effect on the stability of the democratic regime and the consolidation of democracy. In the case of uneven democratization across the electoral, admin- istrative and legal systems of the state—a situation quite common in newly democratic countries—democratic constitutions can actually function against democracy by guaranteeing the legal and political rights of anti-democratic forces within the state. This can further perpetuate the uneven democratiza- tion of state institutions and may eventually threaten the stability and viability of the newly established democratic regime itself. The German case provides current newly democratic states with the lesson that a democratic regime must protect itself against internal threats seeking to use the safeguards of the constitution to destroy the system itself.