Imagination, Suffering, and Perfection: A Kierkegaardian Reflection on Meaning in Life

Q3 Arts and Humanities History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI:10.5406/21521026.38.4.03
Jeffrey Hanson
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Abstract

Engaging the thought of the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard, I challenge a tendency within the analytic tradition of philosophy on the subject of meaning in life. Taking as a starting point Kierkegaard's insights about meaning in life, the striving needed to attain an imagined ideal self, and his paradoxical conception of the perfection available to human life, I claim that meaning in life is a function of an individual's striving for an ideal self. This continuous effort to achieve myself is marked by suffering, an indispensable part of Kierkegaard's project of identity formation. The imagined grasp of a possible ideal self is essential to this process but insufficient for it because the imagination can only ever glimpse a kind of static perfection, not the lived perfection that only results from willed actualization of an ideal self. The meaning of a human life, then, consists in the suffering that results from a struggle to actualize the ideal I aspire to become in the process of identity formation. I contrast this view with a tendency shared by many contemporary analytic philosophers of meaning in life, for whom meaning in life is constituted by achievement of valued goods, without much attention to one's relation to the process of achieving them. In that respect, I will focus on the position of Iddo Landau. After clearing a number of his misconceptions about Kierkegaard's philosophy, I claim that, for a life to be meaningful, valued goods in life must be complemented by a conscious enactment of the process of the formation of one's identity that includes striving to attain a kind of perfection. I conclude that Kierkegaard's paradoxical account of perfectionism makes him more of an ally to Landau than an opponent.
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想象、苦难与完美:克尔凯郭尔对生命意义的反思
借鉴丹麦思想家克尔凯郭尔(Søren Kierkegaard)的思想,我对哲学分析传统中关于生命意义主题的一种倾向提出了挑战。以克尔凯郭尔关于生命意义的见解、为实现想象中的理想自我所需要的努力、以及他对人类生活所能达到的完美的自相矛盾的概念为出发点,我声称,生命的意义是个体为理想自我而奋斗的一种功能。这种实现自我的持续努力以痛苦为标志,这是克尔凯郭尔的身份形成计划中不可或缺的一部分。想象中对一个可能的理想自我的把握对这个过程是必不可少的,但对它来说是不够的,因为想象只能瞥见一种静态的完美,而不是生活的完美,这只能从理想自我的意志实现中产生。因此,人生的意义在于,在身份形成的过程中,为了实现我所渴望成为的理想而进行的斗争所带来的痛苦。我将这种观点与许多当代分析人生意义的哲学家所共有的一种倾向进行了对比,对他们来说,人生的意义是由获得有价值的东西构成的,而不太关注一个人与实现这些东西的过程的关系。在这方面,我将着重谈谈易多兰道的地位。在澄清了他对克尔凯郭尔哲学的一些误解之后,我声称,为了使生活有意义,生活中有价值的东西必须由一个人的身份形成过程的有意识的制定来补充,其中包括努力达到一种完美。我的结论是,克尔凯郭尔对完美主义的矛盾描述使他更像是朗道的盟友,而不是对手。
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来源期刊
History of Philosophy Quarterly
History of Philosophy Quarterly Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
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