{"title":"Using the primal approach to derive the second-best rules for different public services in a general competitive growth model","authors":"Ge Jin","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12614","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we establish a general competitive growth model which includes public consumption services and public productive services, which are financed by capital and labor income taxes. By using the <i>primal</i> approach, we derive the second-best rules for both types of public services and compare them with the conventional first-best rules. Particularly, we find that the second-best rule for public consumption generally differs from the conventional rule due to distortionary taxation. Whether the conventional rule represents an under- or over-supply of public consumption depends on the form of preference. Finally, by solving a specific example theoretically and numerically, we show that the absolute difference of the first- and second-best ratios of public-to-private consumption increases with an increase in distorting taxes as long as the two ratios differ.</p>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"24 6","pages":"1564-1590"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.12614","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper we establish a general competitive growth model which includes public consumption services and public productive services, which are financed by capital and labor income taxes. By using the primal approach, we derive the second-best rules for both types of public services and compare them with the conventional first-best rules. Particularly, we find that the second-best rule for public consumption generally differs from the conventional rule due to distortionary taxation. Whether the conventional rule represents an under- or over-supply of public consumption depends on the form of preference. Finally, by solving a specific example theoretically and numerically, we show that the absolute difference of the first- and second-best ratios of public-to-private consumption increases with an increase in distorting taxes as long as the two ratios differ.
期刊介绍:
As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.