{"title":"Managerial litigation risk and auditor choice","authors":"Leye Li, Gary S. Monroe, Jeff Coulton","doi":"10.1111/ijau.12322","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our study investigates the causal relationship between managerial litigation risk and auditor choice decisions. Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws at the state level in the United States, we use a stacked regression approach and find a lower propensity for affected firms to switch to higher-quality auditors after the exogenous reduction of managerial litigation risk. This result supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis that lower litigation risk leads to more managerial entrenchment, which allows managers to be opaque in order to enjoy private benefits. This negative effect is mitigated for firms with more audit committee industry expertise and for firms that are more reliant on external finance. Our study contributes to our understanding of how regulatory changes that have an impact on agency problems affect firms' demand for auditing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47092,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Auditing","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijau.12322","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Auditing","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ijau.12322","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Our study investigates the causal relationship between managerial litigation risk and auditor choice decisions. Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws at the state level in the United States, we use a stacked regression approach and find a lower propensity for affected firms to switch to higher-quality auditors after the exogenous reduction of managerial litigation risk. This result supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis that lower litigation risk leads to more managerial entrenchment, which allows managers to be opaque in order to enjoy private benefits. This negative effect is mitigated for firms with more audit committee industry expertise and for firms that are more reliant on external finance. Our study contributes to our understanding of how regulatory changes that have an impact on agency problems affect firms' demand for auditing.
期刊介绍：
In addition to communicating the results of original auditing research, the International Journal of Auditing also aims to advance knowledge in auditing by publishing critiques, thought leadership papers and literature reviews on specific aspects of auditing. The journal seeks to publish articles that have international appeal either due to the topic transcending national frontiers or due to the clear potential for readers to apply the results or ideas in their local environments. While articles must be methodologically and theoretically sound, any research orientation is acceptable. This means that papers may have an analytical and statistical, behavioural, economic and financial (including agency), sociological, critical, or historical basis. The editors consider articles for publication which fit into one or more of the following subject categories: • Financial statement audits • Public sector/governmental auditing • Internal auditing • Audit education and methods of teaching auditing (including case studies) • Audit aspects of corporate governance, including audit committees • Audit quality • Audit fees and related issues • Environmental, social and sustainability audits • Audit related ethical issues • Audit regulation • Independence issues • Legal liability and other legal issues • Auditing history • New and emerging audit and assurance issues
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